http://www.hiiraan.com/news2/2011/dec/wararka_maanta8-16067.htm

Nuune won a week ago. The election was over then, and there. I have no problem if we continue so Ibti could also win

NGONGE, despite the catchy headline Mahiga did not and cannot recognize you My 'horayn' of the Mintid guy is a different story, I don't expect you guys can understand it. Waxaad fahmi kartaan maaha

A Khadar, I forgot to add this for the consumption of the larger readership In avoidance of confusion, Separatist is a one-clan-project. Other clans that do not belong to the separatist block are effectively resisting Somaliland's expansion toward the east (and in the west as it is becoming clear by the day ). It must be borne in mid, that the genesis of separatism lies in historical grievance partly stemming from a perception of clan domination of the Laascaano folks. Mintid Farayare's romantic version of the Hargeysa admin and Jeffersonian democracy he is depicting here is therefore unfounded on the actual reality on the ground. His complaints about clans being mobilizing and his online peace gestures are increasingly contradicted by the policies pursued by his clan. SSC is natural outcome of a clan project that went rouge on its neighbor. There is a reason why Saado Ali is the most hated figure in the Diaspora separatists. It is because her artistic expressions are destroying the myths our separatists in the north constructed. EDIT: The alternative is simple in concept but not necessarily easy to achieve. I would summarize in the following 1) Separatist need to stop dreaming of a different state, 2) Reconciliation among Somalia's political stakeholders, 3) Establishment of all inclusive government for Somalia.

A Khadar, think of Somaliland as a clan of ours who out of legitimate, political grievance resorted to unworkable approach to remedy the past. The stuff they concocted in thier effort to separate from us is quite entertaining . If you read Mintid Farayar's post, the delusion is ever palpable and raw. But I would say this; after the fall of Laascaanood, Somaliland's separatist project has reached a political sealing. With no history of clan majesty to sing for, the victory against their historical nemesis was perhaps too big a feat for them. I am sure in the chewing gatherings of Hargeysa the fall of Laascaanood is a big deal, but the movement it ignited (which our separatists brothers are now constantly complaining about) made a more profound statement about the viability of separatist project. Here you have a large clan with glamorous history whose capital is taken by a neighboring clan that've gone rouge on them. The people who resisted British invasion, and put up twenty years of struggle against an enemy with vast resources and logistical reach are now waking up to a peculiar reality after a century of Darwish movement; a certain northern movement wishes to relive the relics of colonial era, seeking to curve up entire cities and land to reach a wicked political station called closing colonial borders of 1920s. Simply put, with the fall of Lascanod, a lane was crossed. As a result , an entire movement was born to take up the challenge. Result: Diaspora is organizing to reverse the gains of this mad group. And it is scaring the heck out of a lot of separatists in abroad who witness the rebirth of SSC nationalism. So the activism, the Diaspora organizations, and the songs of Saado Ali are all part of that reality. Those who provoked it shall have no reason to complain about it---they are akin to the fool that bit a piece he could not swallow. That is how I understand the SSC activism ... Now that said, I am not fond of the denial of other community's achievements. The fact remains in the north, semblance of law and order exists. In the areas where there is a consensus, peace reigns supreme. And I appreciate that. The problem lies in the areas where the separatist delusion attempted to expand ...

I am sure Farax Macalin is having second thoughts about the whole thing :D

Mahiga did not call the recognition of Somaliland (at least in the purported video, which I watched). I think the protest is unwarranted. I also understand that separatists like Mintid Farayar are desperate for publicity. Praising peace and stability of a Somali region is not akin to recognizing or breaking Somalia apart it.

lool@Abu Mansuur's analogy Abu Mansoor's driver-passenger analogy is ironically spot on. However, his pretense and depiction of the organization as a reasonable people open for counsel and advice is the ultimate swagger.

Well said Farax B

Gabal, adeer whether Alshabaab is the future or not is beside the point. Fallaari gil-gilasho kaagama harto, as soon as Kenyans invaded the country you were quick to talk confidently about a looming success in routing out Alshabaab movement as if what Kenyans did is any different than what Ethiopians did in 2006/7. As for your habit to envy and at times show peculiar hate toward all things Garowe, there is nothing xiinfaniin or anyone else can do about that. But I must note that Garowe too has felt the indignity of Somalia's lack of central government, that is why its people are loudly yearning for the return of Somalia.

This is the future of Somalia

:D@certain people have taken to fiction to satisfy their hatred so true. One can disagree with Ina Yusuf but the hatred laden creative writing of certain people is indeed pathetic.

^^Gedo soo meeshaydii maaha awoowe ? Ninyahow, forum kaan belo dhan baa timaada oo waa dhab, laakini dhawr aan caqligooda ku qoslaa jira. This story is changing indeed. But one thing that does not change is the fact these bombardments did not and will not bring stability to Somalia.

Xan maaha, reer waqooyi waa quus. The question is not whether they are ready to come back to the fold. The question is how and when.

^^Abtigis thinks the good Dr is xiinfaniin But again you are not adding any value to the large discussion, Ayoub. The gallery begs the commentary of Abtigis. He is a good entertainer, and the gallery knows it.

Jacaylbaro;763262 wrote: Warsaxaafadeed Xalay, gelinkii danbe meesha la yidhaahdo Saameel oo u dhaxaysa degmooyinka Gabiley iyo Baki waxa ka dhacay shil foolxun waxaana lagu dilay 3 nin oo aan waxba galabsan. Madaxweynaha JSL, Mudane, Axmed Maxamed Maxamuud (Siilaanyo) waxa uu saaka isugu yeedhay talisyada Guud ee Ciidanka Qaranka iyo Booliska iyo Wasaaraddaha Arrimaha Gudaha iyo gaashaan Dhiga waxaanu si Adag u Amray in ay raacdo galaan oo ay soo qabtaan dhagar qabayaashi dilkaas geystay meel kasta oo ay joogaana ay kaga daba tagaan. Madaxweynuhu waxa uu masuuliyiintaa ku adkeeyey in aanay ka soo hooyanin ilaa ay dhagar qabayaashaa soo qabtaan oo ay sharciga horkenaan. Ugu danbay waxa uu Madaxweynuhu Tacsi u dirayaa qoysaskii iyo qaraabadii ay ka baxeen dadkaas ay gacanta ka xaqa darani dishay. Waxaanu leeyahay Ilaahay samir iyo iimaan haynaga siiyo iyagana naxariistii Janno ha ka waraabiyo. ALLAA MAHAD LEH Cabdillaahi Maxamed Daahir (Cukuse) Af-hayeenka Madaxtooyada JSL. Good move by the old man

Mee kii xumaaye lahaa reer Gedood ka anaa muxalil u ah oo faragelinta shisheeyaha u sacab tumayey?

Faahfaahin ku saabsan duqeyn shalay ka dhacday Gobolka Gedo oo ay ku dhinteen dad Barakacayaal ah Sabti, Saturday, December 03, 2011 (HOL) - Diyaarado Nooca dagaalka oo aan la aqoon cida rasmiga ah ee iska leh ayaa shalay gelinkii danbe duqeymo ba’an ka geystay deegaan lagu magacaabo Ceelcade e oo katirsan gobolka Gedo. Diyaaradaha oo noocoodu dadka deeganka ay ku sheegeen"Miig", ayaa la sheegay in ay dhowr gantaal la beegsadeen xero ay ku noolaayeen dad barakacayaal ah, halkaasina ay waxyeello ba’an kasoo gaartay dad ku noolaa xeradaasi. Nabadoon Max’ed Axmed Faarax oo kamid ah waxgaradka deeganka Ceelcade ayaa HOL u xaqiijiyay dhimashada Sedex qof oo rayid ah iyo dhaawaca sagaal kale kuwaa oo uu sheegay in xilligii ay duqeynta dhaceysay ay ku sugnaayeen gudaha mid kamid ah xerooyinka barakacayaasha ee ku yaal deegaanka Ceelcade. “Waxaa isbitalka la geeyay oo aan indhaheyga ku arkay 9 qof oo 6 kamid ah ay ahaayeen carruur, kuwaa oo dhaawacoodu halisyahay,” ayuu yiri Nabadoon Maxed Farax. Xiriiro kala duwan oo aan la sameynay deegaanka Ceelcade ayay dadka deegaanku noo xaqiijyeen in dhibaatadu ay aad u badantahay, iyadoona shacabka ku dhaqan deegaanka ay lasoo darastay cabsi, waxaana ay sidoo kale sheegeen in dad badan ay guryahoodii ka barakaceen kuwaa oo duurka u kala yaacay ilaa iyo imikana aan la garaneyn halka ay beegsadeen. Diyaaradaha wax duqeeyay ayaa loo maleynayaa in ay leedahay dowladda Kenya, Waxaana gudoomiyaha gobolka Gedo ee dowladda KMG Max’ed Cabdi Kaliil uu xusay in Duqeyntii shalay lala beegsaday saldhigyo ay lahaayeen xoogaga Alshabaab, oo uu sheegay in ay ku dhex dhuuntaan shacabka. Gudoomiyaha ayaa sidoo kale sheegay in ay aad uga xunyihiin qasaaraha dhimasho iyo dhaawac ee soo gaaray shacabka, waxaana uu ugu baaqay dadka shacabka ah in ay isaga fogaadaan goobaha ay ku suganyihiin dagaalyahannada xoogaga Alshabaab. Ma ahan markii ugu horeeyso oo duqeyn lala beegsado goob ay ku suganyihiin dad barakacayaal ah, hore ayay duqeyn tan lamid ah diyaarado ay leedahay dowladda Kenya uga geysteen degmada Jilib ee gobolka J/hoose, iydoona ay sababtay dhimasho iyo dhaawac soo gaaray dad baracayaal ah oo ku sugnaa xeradaasi. Waxgaradka iyo aqoonyahannada kasoo jeeda gobolka Gedo ayaa si kulul u cambaareeyay duqeyntii shalay ka dhacday gobolkaasi ee ay ku waxyeeloobeen dadka rayidka ah, Waxaana ay sheegeen in gobolka ay kajirto dhibaato nololeed islamarkaasina ay tahay arrin laga naxo iyo la duqeeyo dad barakacayaal ah oo markii hore dhibaato abaareed qabay. Xasan Nuur, Hiiraan Online

This is the sort of analysis that exposes our friend Abtigis for the sham he is. Where is he now?

Although the A.U. and I.G.A.D. urge that the K.D.F. be folded into AMISOM, the “donor”-powers resist, so Kenya is left with a joint security operation with the T.F.G. on paper, and AMISOM is left to perform its mandate within the constraints laid down by the “donor”-powers. Ethiopia has refrained from signing on to any joint operation and is acting on its own “in support” of others’ efforts. Kenya remains isolated, the T.F.G.’s writ does not extend to the southern and central regions, AMISOM remains with the T.F.G. in Mogadishu, and Ethiopia is working with the array of proxies it has previously cultivated. The A.U. has been sidelined, and I.G.A.D. is limited in its support of Kenya’s and Ethiopia’s operations by its commitment registered in the U.N. “roadmap” to support the “donor”-powers’ transition process. The Kenyan dream of a joint force in which AMISOM would take primary responsibility and would be given robust financial backing and logistical support by the “donor”-powers has ceded to the reality of an inadequate Kenyan operation in a desperate quest for support that keeps running up blind alleys, while AMISOM is reined in, and Ethiopia keeps its options open. The present situation in southern and central Somalia results from the indeterminate, confused, and unstable geo-political consequences of Kenya’s premature invasion. Kenya’s ineptitude and its desperate and failed attempts to draw other powers into its adventure has for the moment stalled the balkanization process in its very earliest stages. That gives those who are resisting balkanization some breathing space, but by no means does it take the partition of Somalia off the table.

The regional powers have thus far not succeeded in moving either down or up the chain. There are no political structures and groups that have been prepared to replace H.S.M. – if it is defeated – and to function at the level of large regions. Instead, there are crazy-quilts of contending factions that have not been reconciled or displaced, making it currently impossible to designate reliable proxies. On the other side, the “donor”-powers appear to be sticking to the “transition” that they have set up and are not in favor of partition until and unless the “transition” to a permanent Somali state fails. Without Somali domestic actors to provide the bodies to run administrations and the “donor”-powers to provide the funds to make them viable, balkanization cannot get off the ground. Without proxy chains there can be no balkanization of sourthern and central Somalia, and there are no proxy chains; there are only Kenyan and Ethiopian military forces occupying parts of their presumptive spheres of influence. In addition to obstacles up and down the presumptive chains, there is a lack of coordination among the forces that have intervened in Somalia. The I.G.A.D. communiqué called for “enhanced coordination between AMISOM, TFG forces, and KDF,” and now Ethiopia would presumably be included. “Coordination,” indeed, was the buzz word of the diplomatic activity in November, but coordination has not come to pass.

After the I.G.A.D. communique was issued, Reuters reported on a Western diplomatic source who said that it was “difficult to see” how the K.D.F. could be folded into AMISOM, “given that the salaries of the soldiers are paid for by the West. There’s no stomach for giving any money to AMISOM.” The Washington Post quoted a U.S. State Department official to the same effect: “I don’t see any increase [in AMISOM]. We’re already at a very high level.” A U.S. defense department official told the Washington Post: “We have always been very cautious, prudent, concerned about the neighbors getting involved.” Conclusion: Obstacles to Balkanization The diplomatic outcomes of Kenya’s efforts during the second half of November to gain support for its invasion of southern Somalia show the obstacles in the way of any attempt to balkanize Somalia in the short term. That attempt would originate with Kenya, Ethiopia, and the organization that they dominate, I.G.A.D. From that starting point in the middle of the presumptive proxy chain, the regional powers would have to work down to secure viable client administrations in the south and center, and up to get the backing of the international coalition, the “donor”-powers working through the U.N.

After November 26, Ethiopian forces began to move into the central regions, where they coordinated with their existing proxies, the AhluSunnawal-Jama’a movement (A.S.W.J.), which controls parts of those regions, and local forces loosely or nominally affiliated with the T.F.G. Ethiopia’s aims are unclear. Was it reluctantly giving Kenya a hand, as some sources said; or was it making a bid, given the opening provided by Kenya’s plea for help, to gain a foothold for setting up its own sphere of influence in the central regions, as other sources reported? It is too early to know, but it is likely that Addis Ababa will tread carefully and will not make Nairobi’s mistake of mounting a major operation without political preparation on the ground. Both Kenyan and Ethiopian forces are inside their presumptive spheres of influence in Somalia, but balkanization remains distant. There is time for domestic Somali political forces to resist partition. At the top of the proxy chain, the “donor”-powers seem to have no appetite for imposing the no-fly zones and naval blockades being urged on them by Kenya, I.G.A.D., and the A.U./AMISOM; to increase AMISOM’S force level by folding the K.D.F. into the peacekeeping mission; or giving meaningful logistical support to the K.D.F. on the ground. On November 23, U.S. under-secretary of state for Africa, Johnny Carson, refused to endorse the Kenyan operation, recommending instead that “the best way to deal with al-Shabaab and address the security threat in Somalia is to use AMISOM as the core element in the fight and to work from Mogadishu in helping the Transitional Federal Government in extending its authority.” Carson “urged” Kenya and Ethiopia to “work through AMISOM to address the security challenges facing them from Somalia.” It is clear that there can be no balkanization of southern and central Somalia, and no proxy chains as long as the “donor”-powers led by the U.S. remain wedded to the T.F.G. as the major instrument with which to effect a “transition” of Somalia to a permanent constitutional government implemented through a roadmap supervised by the U.N. and I.G.A.D., the latter of which has now been compromised for that purpose by its endorsement of the Kenyan and Ethiopian operations.

Although Nairobi would have liked “Azania” to be its partner, that has proven to be impossible, stalling the balkanization of the south from the outset. The Azanian forces have proven to be inadequate and Nairobi has had to take in the R.K.M. More importantly, the T.F.G.’ president, Sh. Sharif Sh. Ahmad, did not endorse the Kenyan invasion, which led Kenya to call a meeting in Nairobi on November 16, between Sh. Sharif; Kenya’s president, MwaiKibaki; and Uganda’s president, YoweriMuseveni (Uganda plays the lead role in the African Union peacekeeping mission (AMISOM) in Mogadishu that protects the T.F.G.). The communiqué issued following the meeting registered Sh. Sharif’s endorsement of a “joint Kenya-Somali security operation,” not a joint Kenya-T.F.G. operation, certainly not a joint Kenya-Azania operation, and not a joint Kenya-T.F.G.-Azania-R.K.M. operation. Judgment day was deferred. Nairobi had more important things to think about than how the south would be run after H.S.M. was gone – its invasion had stalled and it needed all the help it could get on the ground and in the diplomatic conference rooms. Having failed even to begin to build a proxy chain in the south, Kenya turned up the presumptive chain, launching an intensive diplomatic effort to win support for its invasion from I.G.A.D., the A.U., and the “donor”-powers. For the week and a half following the November 16 Nairobi communiqué, Kenyan officials pressed their plea for support at meetings of the A.U.’s Peace and Security Council, troop-contribution countries to AMISOM and interested states, and with Ethiopia. Kenya’s push culminated in a meeting of I.G.A.D. heads of state. The communiqué issued after the I.G.A.D. meeting on November 25 “welcomed the joint security operation” of the K.D.F. and, now, “T.F.G. forces” against H.S.M., further diminishing the likelihood of Kenya securing a buffer-client state in the south. The communique also called upon “the Ethiopian government to support the Kenyan-T.F.G. and [now] AMISOM operation,” which Ethiopia was in the process of doing. In order to save its foundering operation, Kenya had to accept the lead of the T.F.G., at least nominally, in Somalia; coordinate with AMISOM and perhaps, according to the communiqué, fuse with it; and draw Ethiopia into the conflict in order to open up a front in the central regions. The dreams of a buffer-client state were long gone, at least for the time being.

That is how the completed process would look. It would be imposed on Somalis from the outside. It would not be the utopia envisioned by Western intellectual policy pushers of the “bottom-up” or “building-blocks” approach, in which a Somali political community would rise from the scattered grassroots. It would not be the Swiss model of cantonalism. It would be a form of neo-colonialism. Those who favor “building blocks” or “bottom up” are either naïve or disingenuous. They assume that the Somali people are surrounded by benevolent powers that would not take advantage of the Somali people’s division and resulting weakness. The reality of balkanization is the proxy chain. At present, the proxy chains have not yet been formed. They are incipient. Kenya and Ethiopia have entered their presumptive spheres of influence, but they are far from having eliminated H.S.M. and they have not won the endorsement of balkanization from the “donor”-powers. They also confront contention between Somali actors for the client roles and some resistance by Somali actors to balkanization. The process has, however, entered its earliest phase. The First and Preliminary Stage of Balkanization Stalls The first step in forming the finished proxy chains that would structure balkanization of southern and central Somalia is eliminating H.S.M. from those territories. That is the explicit aim of the Kenyan invasion, which is shared by Ethiopia, I.G.A.D., the African Union, and the “donor”-powers. Balkanization cannot occur if the territory is not cleared of rivals to new administrations dependent on neighboring states. By itself, however, getting rid of H.S.M. does not necessarily involve balkanization. It is a matter of what political structure and which groups replace H.S.M. – client administrations of Kenya and Ethiopia, or local administrations tied to a Somali national administration, or some de facto mixture of the two. At present, the political order of the southern and central regions that have been cleared of H.S.M. has not been determined and is a matter of contention among the presumptive members of the proxy chains. The problem of what and who would replace H.S.M. is particularly acute for Kenya, which has no coherent policy due to the political complexity of the south and Nairobi’s poor planning for its invasion, which was executed before the political ground had been prepared for success. As a result, Nairobi is caught between three Somali “allies” – the presumptive Azania state, which Nairobi has nurtured as a proxy and has armed, and which would form the leadership of a buffer state dependent on Kenya and providing a cordon sanitaire for it; the Raskamboni movement (R.K.M.) on which the Kenyan Defense Force (K.D.F.) relies in its operations and which directly rivals “Azania;” and forces loosely and sometimes nominally linked to “Somalia’s” internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.).