The U.S. government needs to change its Somalia policy — and fast. For the better part of two decades, instability and violence have confounded U.S. and international efforts to bring peace to Somalia. The international community’s repeated attempts to create a government have failed, even backfired. The United States’ efforts since 9/11 to prevent Somalia from becoming a safe haven for al Qaeda have alienated large parts of the Somali population, polarized the country’s diverse Islamist reform movement into moderate and extremist camps, and propelled indigenous Salafi jihadist groups to power. One of these groups, a radical youth militia known as al Shabab, now controls most of Somalia’s southern half and has established links with al Qaeda. The brutal occupation of Somalia by its historical rival Ethiopia from late 2006 to early 2009, which Washington openly supported, only fueled the insurgency and infuriated Somalis across the globe. One of Washington’s concerns today is that al Qaeda may be trying to develop a base somewhere in Somalia from which to launch attacks outside the country. Another is that more and more alienated members of the Somali diaspora might embrace terrorism, too. Somali nationals were arrested in Minnesota in early 2009 after returning from fighting alongside al Shabab, and in August 2009, two Somalis were arrested in Melbourne for planning a major suicide attack on an Australian army installation. The first American ever to carry out a suicide bombing did so in Somalia in October 2008. These isolated incidents have generated more hype than they deserve, but they have nonetheless put the Obama administration in a tough position. If only to avoid seeming weak in combating terrorism, it must prevent these threats from escalating, but it is entering the fray at a time when almost any international action in Somalia is likely to reinforce the Somalis’ anti-Western posture. Alarmingly, the State Department seems not to realize this or the failures of past policy. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is clinging to the bankrupt strategy of supporting the Transitional Federal Government, Somalia’s notional government but really a dysfunctional institution that has failed to garner much support from the population. Barricaded in a small corner of Mogadishu behind a wall of international peacekeepers, the TFG is incapable of advancing the United States’ primary interests: stopping the expansion of extremist forces throughout Somalia and preventing the formation of al Qaeda cells, other radical strongholds, and training camps in the country. If anything, the TFG’s presence in Somalia hurts U.S. goals. Resistance to the so-called government has united various radical groups that would otherwise be competing with one another. These groups and the TFG are now locked in a violent stalemate that is further battering the population, making it more likely that certain corners of Somalia will eventually become hospitable environments for al Qaeda. With 3.8 million people urgently in need of relief, Somalia has once again become the site of one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. This error stems from Washington’s mistaken belief that state building is the best response to terrorism. Because Washington has lacked both the political will and the resources to launch a large enough state-building program, U.S. efforts in Somalia have been inadequate. Neither Clinton nor the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Susan Rice, appears ready to support the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force in Somalia. Even if enough resources were available, the conditions on the ground mean the approach would be unlikely to work anyway. Somalis may have grown weary of war, but they remain highly suspicious of centralized government. And they disagree about questions as fundamental as whether a Somali state should be unitary, federal, or confederal; whether the judicial system should be wholly Islamic or a hybrid of sharia and secular law; and whether the northern territory of Somaliland should be granted its long-sought independence. Efforts to create a central government under such conditions are a recipe for prolonging conflict. Another major problem with Washington’s Somalia policy is that it has not kept pace with important shifts in U.S. thinking about how to confront terrorism. In Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, General David Petraeus, former U.S. commander in Iraq; General David McKiernan, former U.S. commander in Afghanistan; and David Kilcullen, a counterinsurgency expert, among others, have successfully steered U.S. counterterrorism strategies away from militarized tactics focused on killing the enemy. They have promoted more integrated, population-centric approaches that engage traditional local political authorities, civil society, and a wide range of religious actors — strategies that stand a better chance of reducing the tensions between the United States’ counterterrorism, humanitarian, and stabilization goals. John Brennan, the president’s assistant for homeland security and counterterrorism, has said that efforts are under way to develop a new Somalia policy along these lines, but they seem to have been hampered by the lack of an intelligence infrastructure and reliable partners on the ground. Both to protect its interests in Somalia and to help the country, Washington must abandon its hope of building a viable state there and explore new counterterrorism strategies. Perhaps even more important, it needs to better understand the exact nature of the threat that Somalia poses to U.S. national security. For example, piracy has flourished not in the country’s anarchic south but in the weakly governed northern regions. And it is a problem of organized crime, not terrorism. Any links between the pirates and al Shabab are profit-motivated, which suggests that even for al Shabab, ideology can yield to pragmatism. The emergence of yet another indigenous jihadist movement in a faraway corner of the world does not merit a militarized response from the United States or its allies, especially when the absence of reliable intelligence on the ground means that even discrete attacks on terrorist suspects could do more harm than good. The presence of al Qaeda operatives in Somalia is alarming, of course, but it does not mean that transnational terrorism will necessarily spread. In its previous inroads into Somalia, al Qaeda bumped up against Somalia’s xenophobia and its pragmatic, clannish political culture. In the midst of the UN’s invasive state-reconstruction effort in the 1990s, much of the country fell under the control of al Itihaad al Islamiya, a radical movement with links to al Qaeda. But the al Qaeda operatives in the country soon conflicted with recalcitrant nationalist leaders (they considered the locals cowardly for refusing to subscribe to jihad) and were frustrated by the fractious local Islamists and the harsh living conditions, according to a West Point study based on intercepted correspondence. By the mid-1990s, al Itihaad al Islamiya was essentially defunct. Since then, U.S. intelligence analysts have argued that Somalia is fundamentally inhospitable to foreign jihadist groups. Al Qaeda is now a more sophisticated and dangerous creature, but its current foothold in Somalia appears to be largely the product of the West’s latest interference. In fact, the terrorist threat posed by Somalia has grown in proportion to the intrusiveness of international policies toward the country. Al Shabab metamorphosed from a fringe movement opposed to the foreign-backed TFG into a full-blown political insurgency only after the U.S.-supported Ethiopian invasion. It is time for the United States to adopt a policy of constructive disengagement toward Somalia. Giving up on a bad strategy is not admitting defeat. It is simply the wise, if counterintuitive, response to the realization that sometimes, as in Somalia, doing less is better. THE GRIP OF TERROR For decades, Somalia was little more to Americans than a pawn in the Cold War. Then, in 1992, U.S. televisions were flooded with images of dying Somali children, the victims of brutal warlords and their civil war. With Operation Restore Hope, the U.S. government set out to respond not only to the humanitarian emergency but also to the clarion call of a new era of peacemaking and multilateral cooperation. Initially intended as a relief effort, the mission soon got mired in Somalia’s violent internal politics. On July 12, 1993, U.S. forces mistakenly attacked a peaceful meeting of clan elders, killing 73 civilians. The mission had derailed, and a few months later it hit bottom when a Somali mob desecrated the corpses of U.S. soldiers. The incident, known as “Black Hawk down,” was a bewildering assault on the American public’s self-image, not to mention a low-water mark of the Clinton administration, and it left the Americans and the Somalis distrustful of each other. For close to a decade afterward, the U.S. government effectively let Somalia be. Even so, it remained concerned. After the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and then 9/11, what had once seemed like a humanitarian imperative to intervene in Somalia receded. The growing concern that the country’s lawless territories could become a safe haven for al Qaeda quickly drove the Bush administration’s Somalia policy, producing a series of failed political interventions designed to create a central government in Somalia. In 2002, the UN bankrolled efforts by regional actors to set up a transitional government. Negotiations with warlords and clan and civil-society leaders sputtered for a couple of years and then bred the TFG. The TFG’s purpose was to balance the interests of all of Somalia’s clans, but in practice, it was dominated by the ***** clan, from the north. This left the ******, Somalia’s majority clan, feeling like it had been shortchanged, and it responded by striking an anti-TFG alliance of convenience with the business community and a group of sharia courts in Mogadishu. The alliance’s goal was to restore enough order in the capital, a ****** stronghold, to undermine the *****’s efforts to locate the seat of government elsewhere. Meanwhile, a group of militant youths formed al Shabab, and although it, too, was associated with the coalition, it belonged to its more radical and violent fringe and started assassinating members of the TFG. Had it not been for the United States’ counterterrorism efforts, the sharia courts and al Shabab might have remained marginal. By early 2006, the TFG’s inability to govern was evident; the group no longer posed a meaningful threat to the ******. The defensive alliance it had struck with the Islamists and the business community quickly fizzled out. Al Shabab remained isolated, but some businesspeople and criminals were still compelled to form the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism, a pro-government group intent on capturing and deporting suspected terrorists. Public outrage over the United States’ support of the group, which included several despised warlords, sparked a vicious four-month battle for the control of Mogadishu that eventually brought the Islamic Courts Union, the ******-backed sharia courts, to power. The ICU’s rise was the result more of happenstance than strategy, but by quickly bringing an unprecedented degree of order to Mogadishu, the movement generated nationwide enthusiasm, and the sharia-court model was soon replicated across the country. At first, Washington encouraged the TFG to negotiate with the ICU, but it stopped as soon as it understood that al Shabab was effectively operating as the ICU’s military arm and was intent on enforcing a harsh version of sharia law. The ICU’s policies quickly became unpopular with the public, but Ethiopia nonetheless grew nervous about having a hostile jihadist army that close and so sold to the U.S. government the notion that al Qaeda was controlling the ICU. It was a small step from there to Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia. The move, which occurred in December 2006, with U.S. support, was a catastrophe. By then, the ICU had exhausted the Somalis’ patience, and it dissolved overnight, its leaders scattering into the bush in southern Somalia or fleeing to Eritrea. Ethiopia was forced to occupy Mogadishu to prop up the unpopular TFG, and its presence ignited a complex insurgency. Rampant human rights abuses by the Ethiopian army and the TFG’s forces, including the firing of mortar on hospitals and the indiscriminate shelling of civilians, turned the population against the government and its patron, the United States. Washington aggravated the outrage by dropping bombs on terrorist targets and thereby allegedly killing scores of civilians. Jihadists from the Middle East, sensing an unprecedented opportunity to find a foothold in the shifting sands of Somalia’s conflict, poured resources into the hands of al Shabab. It recruited a host of angry, desperate young fighters. Experienced terrorists arrived from Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan — even Malaysia — and brought with them suicide bombings and sophisticated tactics such as remote-controlled detonations. By the time the Ethiopian forces withdrew in early 2009, al Shabab’s influence had spread throughout southern Somalia. Under the Bush administration, Somalia became a front in the war on terrorism. A messy decades-long conflict was recast as an ideological battle between secular democracy and Islam, between “moderates” and “extremists” — blunt categories that blurred important differences in ideologies and tactics. This oversimplification has both severely undermined the capacity of U.S. and other international representatives to relate to the Somali public and allowed al Shabab to unify an otherwise diverse array of actors into a motivated armed opposition. NEITHER NOR There are now two dominant camps in Somalia, the vocally pro-Western TFG and the vocally radical al Shabab. Although they seem diametrically opposed, both are alliances of fortune, and the line between them is thinner than is often believed. Both are mostly driven by clannish and economic interests that often trump ideology in determining allegiances. Yet many experts and diplomats, including Secretary of State Clinton, make much of the groups’ differences and argue that the TFG is Somalia’s “best chance” for peace, a label that has been attached to every Somali government since 2000. The current optimism centers on the designation of a new president, Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed, a Muslim cleric who had been vilified by the State Department when he chaired the ICU but was conveniently resurrected as a peacemaker in late 2008, in the run-up to Ethiopia’s withdrawal from Somalia. Sheik Sharif has attempted to position the revamped TFG as a moderate Islamist government, primarily by promising to implement sharia law. But his willingness to engage with Ethiopia and the West has hampered his efforts. The TFG has been categorically rejected as a proxy of the West by the bulk of Somalia’s armed political opposition, and although it has won some hearts and minds, it has failed to generate much grass-roots support. The TFG’s paramilitary forces — a ragtag cluster of groups beholden to various warlords with posts in the government — are a shambles. Even though the United States and its allies have tried to prop up these underpaid forces with ammunition and training, they, as well as members of the TFG and foreign peacekeepers, have been accused of selling munitions to al Shabab for profit — a claim that seems to be substantiated by the precipitous drop in munitions prices on Mogadishu’s black market. Except among hard-liners in al Shabab, loyalty is in short supply. Even if the TFG were able to control more territory, this would serve little good: the government is simply incapable of governing. The parliament has swollen to an unwieldy 550 members. Most of its members reside safely outside the country, and the remainder are paralyzed by factionalism and infighting; just getting a parliamentary quorum in Mogadishu requires Herculean support from the UN. The ad hoc addition of Sheik Sharif’s Islamist faction to the TFG’s clan-based structure, and the parliament’s promise to implement some still unspecified form of sharia law, has turned the TFG into a muddle of Islamist and democratic ideologies. The government’s only real value is to provide a legitimating façade for the international community’s opposition to al Shabab. This opposition largely takes the form of the African Union’s mission to Somalia, known as AMISOM. But so far, this effort has been as ineffective as previous international interventions in Somalia. With support from Washington and the United Nations, the AU is desperately trying to increase AMISOM’s contingent from 5,000 troops to 8,000 and is arguing that these forces should be free to launch preemptive attacks on al Shabab. In August, Secretary of State Clinton promised to help the AU increase its supplies of munitions to the TFG forces. Like the Ethiopian forces that came before it, AMISOM is widely viewed as a combatant in the conflict and has been accused by the local press and some clan leaders of firing indiscriminately on civilians. Both al Shabab and legitimate authorities among the clans and Mogadishu’s local clerics council have called for ousting the troops. Under these circumstances, bolstering the AMISOM contingent is a fool’s errand. At the height of its occupation of Mogadishu in 2008, the 15,000 forces led by the Ethiopian army made no headway against the al Shabab-led insurgency. A decisive military response against today’s more powerful and better-organized radical camp would require far more troops than AMISOM or the TFG could ever muster. That said, the radical camp is in no better shape than the TFG. Based in the port city of Kismaayo, it is an awkward coalition of opportunistic clan factions, fundamentalist nationalists, and a few vocal al Qaeda supporters who are committed to the Salafi strand of Islam, control substantial resources sent from the Middle East, and have capitalized on the international hysteria surrounding terrorism. Al Shabab’s hold on power, especially its purported control over territory, is weak. Although it holds sway over much of the country’s southern half (except for the central districts of Galgaduud and Hiiraan), it does not govern so much as occupy territory through a mixture of public relations, manipulation of local clan conflicts, and outright intimidation. At the approach of a hostile militia, al Shabab often melts into the bush and keeps away until reinforcements arrive. Its blunt efforts to impose sharia law have irritated clans across the country, as have its attempts to ignite local conflicts. Its meddling in Galgaduud, for example, prompted warring ****** subclans there to form a counterforce of local clans and business factions. This alliance is often described as a moderate Islamist movement because it has adopted the banner of Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama (ASWJ), an apolitical, nonmilitary organization that represents the practice of Sufi mysticism. Thanks to the group’s heavy reliance on financial and logistic support from the Ethiopian army, al Shabab has already managed to depict it as another proxy of the West. As al Shabab has gained ground, it has attracted opportunists and consequently has fractured along both ideological and clan lines. The inclusion of more pragmatic, nationalist factions, such as Hizbul Islam, itself an alliance of convenience, led by Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys, has challenged the dominance of the radical leaders. Sheik Aweys is a wanted terrorist suspect, but he is distinctly less radical than his counterparts in Kismaayo. He has periodically appeared open to negotiation with the TFG. Al Shabab may be a brutal local political movement, in other words, but it is not a transnational terrorist organization that might one day pose a serious threat to U.S. national security. It has stirred only a few hundred true fanatics — not thousands — and attracted many more thugs, mostly teenage boys. The disturbing acts of violence that have dominated media reports, including beheadings and amputations and the pulling of gold fillings from the teeth of ordinary Somalis, are often committed by illiterate children rather than radical leaders. There has been little reporting in the West of the fact that a wide majority of al Shabab factions have actively cooperated with international humanitarian relief efforts — if only for a fee — and that many of them have publicly condemned terrorist activities and banditry. The presence of al Qaeda operatives in al Shabab’s ranks is indeed alarming, but it is as much a tactical arrangement as an ideological alignment. And the utility for al Shabab of having foreign jihadists fighting by its side will decrease as doing so begins to impede the group’s hopes of governing Somalia: many Somalis condemn the presence of foreign fighters in the country on the grounds that they are bound to promote non-Somali values or act like brutal colonizers. Unless the outsiders learn to adopt nonviolent Sufi Islamic practices, their involvement will not last. Sheik Muktar Robow, the former spokesperson of al Shabab and once a backer of al Qaeda, has publicly argued this point. And in fact, differences of opinion have developed between the radicals in Kismaayo and their Hizbul Islam hosts. The tenuous nature of these alliances means there is no clear horse on which the U.S. government can bet. Both the TFG and al Shabab have backers among Somalis, but neither can count on a critical mass. The ostensibly moderate ASWJ has local supporters, but its factionalism and its dependence on Ethiopia are likely to undermine its capacity to generate a national constituency. No doubt this is a problem for the advocates of state building, who were counting on the TFG to be the solution to anarchy. But the weakness of all the parties is also something of a blessing: it means that al Shabab is less powerful than is often feared. The implications of this are clear. With no side capable of keeping the peace if it wins the war, the U.S. government, as well as the rest of the international community, should not focus its efforts on backing any one group. It should also forget about grand political projects to create a central government authority, which are likely to be futile. PARSING THE PLAYERS Backing off this way entails risks, including the possibility that al Shabab will cement, if only temporarily, its hold on southern Somalia. But this is the only way to ensure that the growing tensions within al Shabab and the latent tensions between al Shabab and al Qaeda will play out. Exploiting these tensions is the most reliable and cost-effective means of fighting terrorism in Somalia. It will be impossible to isolate the truly dangerous elements from the nationalist, the pragmatic, and the merely thuggish factions of al Shabab until the United States stops supporting one group over another and disconnects local conflicts in Somalia from broader counterterrorism efforts. Washington’s first step, after abandoning what has been its policy for years now, should be to learn to coexist with al Shabab: since the movement is a coalition of fortune, it is susceptible to realignment under the right conditions, and the quickest method of creating those conditions is to open the door to coexistence with the West. Removing al Shabab from the U.S. government’s list of terrorist organizations may be too controversial politically in the United States, but it might be possible to delist specific individuals. For example, Sheik Aweys, whose ambitions of becoming a mainstream national leader have been undermined by his status as a terrorist, has reportedly expressed a keen desire to be taken off the list. Granting his wish could induce him to condemn the imposition of a foreign Salafi agenda on Somalia and to delink the Hizbul Islam movement from al Shabab. The same may be true of the many other opportunistic actors who have aligned with the al Shabab leadership in order to resist Western influence in Somalia or simply to survive. It is in the United States’ interest to learn to distinguish these actors from its real enemies. But that would mean not taking all pro-al Shabab rhetoric at face value and tolerating uncertainty while the local struggle for influence plays out, town by town. Being patient now would not foreclose the possibility of a military intervention later, but it would reduce the likelihood that such an effort would be needed. Isolating the truly dangerous factions of al Shabab would also require addressing legitimate local grievances. A plurality of important Somali actors — al Shabab, Hizbul Islam, Mogadishu’s local clerics council, and the ****** leadership — want the foreign troops to leave and foreign governments to interfere less in Somalia’s political affairs. This may be too much for the United States and its allies to concede: they want to keep AMISOM in Mogadishu to monitor the situation there, prevent the TFG’s collapse, and support international humanitarian relief efforts. But a compromise may be possible. Washington could urge the AU and the UN to either disband the TFG or — perhaps a more palatable option — relocate it outside Somalia. The AU could then negotiate for AMISOM to remain on the condition that it only deliver humanitarian relief. If AMISOM’s mandate is so redefined, its presence should no longer be as controversial. And as long as the force stays in Mogadishu — and retains its control over the airport and the port — the TFG’s removal would not seem like an admission of defeat: the international community could still defend itself against the charge that al Shabab overtook the capital. Such a decisive shift from Washington’s current interventionist strategy could help undo the harm caused by past U.S. policy and set the stage for more constructive engagement down the line. GRASS ROOTS VERSUS ASTROTURF At some later point, when the anti-U.S. sentiment has subsided, it will indeed be desirable for Washington to try to address the deeper causes of anarchy in Somalia. But it will have to be extremely mindful not to revive past prescriptions, including the idea of finding and supporting national political figures in Somalia. Somalia’s leaders, including Sheik Sharif and Sheik Aweys, have limited constituencies and lack credibility across clan and regional lines. The U.S. government should maintain a neutral posture toward clan leaders and warlords alike while also being careful not to empower them and trigger rivalries. It should refrain from trying to achieve an equitable balance of power among Somalia’s fractious clans. So far, that approach has succeeded only in creating a very large and very paralyzed government. Given the shortage of viable national leaders, bottom-up governance strategies might appear to be a solution to Somalia’s messy, perpetually shifting decentralized politics. For instance, the experience of the ICU, which brought unparalleled stability to an unruly Mogadishu almost overnight in 2006, is instructive. Its ideology may have been distasteful, but its tenure did amount to a kind of inclusive and homegrown rule-of-law project: administered by religious leaders, supervised by the clans, underwritten by Mogadishu’s business community, and ardently embraced by the public. The ICU’s rise was the result of an exceptional confluence of trends that would be difficult to replicate: the growing influence of local sharia courts as a source of law and order, the business community’s willingness to invest in promoting public security, a clan-based backlash against international efforts to back the TFG and then the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism, and the population’s readiness for peace. And its tenure was short; proving too inclusive for its own good, the ICU was quickly co-opted by al Shabab. Nonetheless, the ICU’s stint in power is proof that effective governance can emerge rapidly in Somalia when the conditions are right. Such arrangements, although admittedly fragile, have emerged in the northern regions of Somaliland and Puntland. The best of them depend on local, rather than international, resources to deliver economic growth and other concrete benefits to the public and respect relations among clan and religious leaders, business groups, and civil society. These arrangements stand in marked contrast to another kind of bottom-up approach, the so-called building blocks strategy favored by the UN during the 1990s. In theory, that approach is intended to empower local actors, but in practice, its focus on appointing officials and building professionalized institutions tends to make it so prescriptive as to leave little room for local innovations. It is a bottom-up approach with all the drawbacks of a top-down approach: it breeds conflicts over representation, diverts resources into futile capacity-building projects, and creates clunky administrative structures that local tax revenues cannot support. Rather than endorsing this pseudo-grass-roots approach or formally promoting models of governance, the U.S. government should support cooperative, community-based development efforts. Development can, and ultimately will, lay the foundation for equitable, sustainable political reform in Somalia. Local reconciliation efforts driven by the practical need to manage various clans’ access to water and grazing land have been very successful, most spectacularly in the conflict-ridden town of Gaalkacyo. The need to renegotiate and enforce arrangements over water and land has provided regular opportunities for dialogue and compromise. The ****** and ***** clans of Gaalkacyo have also leveraged these negotiations into broader cooperation, for example, creating a joint security force and primary schools attended by both clans. Before the Ethiopian invasion in late 2006, such deals had significantly reduced instability across Somalia. Likewise, local nongovernmental organizations, notably the women’s group SAACID, have been experimenting with cross-community development projects — ranging from food relief to citywide garbage collection — with outstanding results. The programs are designed and organized in open meetings, and the distribution of benefits is conditional on active cross-clan cooperation. Somali actors are generally responsive to economic incentives. Most combatants are freelancers who have been forced to join militias out of economic need; in fact, they are often stigmatized as bandits for making such a move. In order to give them options other than employment with militias, the United States should promote targeted local development initiatives, such as a decentralized microcredit scheme that would engage both the Somali diaspora worldwide and existing local authorities. So long as these projects steer clear of governance reform, they might encourage the public to pressure local Islamists into distancing themselves from radical anti-Western actors. Somali communities already rely on indigenous trust-based credit-sharing mechanisms, known as hagbed, and Somalia receives approximately $1 billion in remittances each year, mostly from the United States and the Middle East. Most of these funds are spent to meet individual needs, such as food and health care, but if even a fraction were harnessed for use in broader community-development projects, the money could stimulate local enterprise. That, in turn, would support efforts by community leaders to provide Somali youths with alternatives to employment with the militias. Washington should engage its international partners to create a microcredit and community-development fund that would raise contributions from the Somali diaspora and match them one to one. For example, a member of the diaspora could be convinced to contribute $5 of every $200 he would normally send to his family back home to a community-development fund instead, and that amount would then be matched, dollar for dollar, by the international community. The Somali diaspora is widely dispersed, living in large concentrations in the United States (especially in Minnesota and Washington, D.C.), Canada, Norway, and Yemen. It is generally fractured along clan lines, which has made it difficult to mobilize in support of governance and development efforts in Somalia. Moreover, Somalis will not allow their contributions to disappear into a national fund. These problems could be overcome by soliciting and tracking contributions through the use of Web 2.0 technologies, such as blogs and networking sites, which are already extremely popular among diaspora communities, and by ensuring that contributions go to specific villages or neighborhoods. Communities in Somalia could set up local development councils to solicit contributions and oversee their distribution. All transactions could be tracked on a Web site. To further ensure transparency, the selection of council members should be announced online and orally, at regular community meetings, and be subjected to vetting by the public. The selection of credit recipients should also be transparent, and it should be organized on a first-come, first-served basis and be monitored by local nongovernmental organizations or professional contractors. Dispersing the funds through the hawala system, the informal and trust-based means by which Somalis traditionally transfer money, would allow the accounts to be administered remotely from a single location in the United States or Europe. This practice, which has often been unjustly hampered by the West’s investigation into the funding of terrorist networks, would send an important political message of reconciliation to the Somalis. These local development councils might eventually be linked and federalized to promote trade across Somalia and thus promote the development of infrastructure and a regulatory framework. This, in turn, could make a viable basis for the creation of formal national governance mechanisms in Somalia. But first things first. For now, the United States should commit itself to a strategy that promotes development without regard to governance. At the same time, it will have to continue its counterterrorism efforts, although preferably in the form of monitoring and deradicalization strategies pursued in cooperation with the local population rather than air strikes. And it must learn to understand the value of relationships that local rivals build in pursuit of common economic goals. Encouraging development without promoting governance may not yield political outcomes that are palatable to Washington — or even ensure stability in Somalia. But given the near certainty that more assertive efforts will backfire, as they have in the past, it is the only safe way to proceed. Copyright © 2002-2009 by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.

"Blackwater/Xe mercenaries plan to carry out bombings in Mogadishu in order to accuse Al-Shabab of being the culprits in the attacks, the Al-Shabab spokesman added". "He went on to say that the Blackwater/Xe mercenaries have already recruited many lackeys to help them carry out bombings targeting prominent individuals and innocent civilians". What a load of Horse Puckey. Xe`s ship is up for sale in a Port in Spain, and they have no interest in Somalia.

I would appreciate actively engaging anyone here on an open debate on this subject. Or are you somehow Clan or Tribaly biased, racially conflicted or just plain ******. Your silence does not speak any words?

Okay, dont everybody jump at Once ! C`mon people, help me out here?

Wow, no Technicals. Interesting, thanks.

Stay the course. 90% of the reasons you have stated are simply economic. He simply has not received any where near the donor support pledged by International Donor nations, but only a very small fraction of that. Without total support of course he will fail. His cabinet has done a good job of reminding these donor nations of their pledged obligations. Let the money come in so the man can do his job.

Originally posted by Peace Action: Buttressing Puntland will not bring an end to the piracy problem. Because of a combination of increasing government security sweeps, hostility from the local people and the growing preference of the pirates to work in the relatively vacant Indian Ocean (and not the heavily patrolled Gulf of Aden), the locus of attacks has begun to shift from Eyl to ports farther south, particularly Harardhere. But Puntland remains crucial, and success there might prove a model for similar action in in Harardhere, which is governed by another regional administration distinct from the turbulent south, albeit an extremely weak one. The way to begin is by siphoning to Puntland some of the money flowing into the bottomless coffers of the transitional government. If the international community is serious about ending Somali piracy, it must engage Puntland as a full-time partner. The govt of Puntland is serious about stopping piracy and the population is opposed to the criminal gangs so why the concerned pirated countries keep paying ransom instead of helping Punltand to stop piracy off the coast of Somalia? Shipping companies pay ransom, NOT Governments. You have to realize that piracy to shipping companies is a cost/numbers game. Less than 1% of all ships transversing the GOA and Indian Ocean are hijacked, therefore they consider paying these ransoms a cost of doing business in this area.

Somali PM sees rebel rout from capital this month Sun Jan 3, 2010 1:51pm GMT Print | Single Page [-] Text [+] 1 of 1Full Size By Abdiaziz Hassan NAIROBI (Reuters) - Somali government troops are ready to launch a major offensive against insurgents and expect to drive them out of the capital by the end of this month, the country's prime minister told Reuters on Sunday. Talk of an imminent government attack on the rebels has been rife in recent weeks and al Shabaab, the main insurgent group, is reported to have stepped up the forced recruitment of youths into its ranks in readiness for the assault. "Our troops are prepared to act, and flush these terrorists out of the capital before the end of January, and continue taking over the control of more territories from these fighters," said Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke. Somalia has had no effective central government since 1991. The West's efforts to install one have been undermined most recently by the insurgency led by al Shabaab, which Washington views as al Qaeda's proxy in the region. Sharmarke said the government's preparations centred on recruiting and training the troops and reforming the command structure. "We could not go to war overnight, but we put most of our efforts into preparing our forces to act, so that the work can yield some results at the end of the day," he said. U.S.-led military action in Afghanistan and Iraq is piling pressure on al Qaeda groups there, raising Somalia's appeal as a safe haven for the militants, the prime minister said.

in Somalia. Hello, just wanted to introduce myself, as I am new to the board, an American with a Somali wife. I am trying to research this group Ahlusunnah Waljama'a Network, in hopes of involving them in an up and coming project we are submitting to the govts of Somalia. Since I dont read or write Somali or Arabic it has been difficult, though I did spend a number of years in Saudi Arabia and have lived on the Somali Border in Djibouti two years and have been to Hargeisa and driven to Berbera from there. As I am trying to get some solid information on this group I was wondering if some of you here from the board could answer some basic questions. Thanks in advance for participating What is the TFGs opinion of Ahlusunnah Waljama'a Network? Ive read from some Jihadi watch groups that this group has been linked to terrorism "persons of interest", would you consider them a terrorist organization and why? Does the US/UK consider them a Terrorist Organization? They are obviously fighting Hizbul Islam and Al Shabab. Does this mean they would be considered "moderate" Muslims? Why are they fighting Shabab & H.I. ? What is this groups goals in Somalia.

AAAA

Originally posted by Sharmarkee: "Las Geel is undisputably Somaliland's pièce de résistance. Hundreds of magnificent neolithic rock art paintings in perfect condition adorn the walls of several interconnected caves and shelters. Some paintings exceed one metre in length and their state of preservation is exceptional. Were it not in Somaliland, this fantastic site would immediately be declared a World Heritage Site and swamped with masses of tourists. Sadly (well, not quite), as long as Somaliland is not recognised by the international community, all attempts at protecting Las Geel will be unsuccessful and it will remain a hidden gem." Where in the world is Laas Geel?, I heard Laas Ciidle, I heard Laas dhuure,Laas Caanood too, but never Laas Geel. Not entirely true. I drove from Hargeisa to Berbera and we stopped as Las Geel on the way. There is a small town at the turnoff and it is not marked, you have to speak with the townfolk and have them point out the turnoff. Once you find the turnoff you pretty much need a 4x4 to traverse the rough track approximately 8 miles back into the desert. It is protected by a Federal Guard out there at a well marked Camp.

I am trying to learn more about this group. Can anyone tell me where their funding support comes from, and what are their long term goals?

I like them but its missing the Olive Branches of Peace inter-twined with Khat Leaves

Not.... take a look. Who puts this stuff up on the web. This is very obviously not the TFGs website. http://www.somaligovernment.org/index.html

The Lamu Archipelago, Kenya islands A cluster of hot, low-lying desert islands tucked into the coast near the Somalian border, Lamu and its neighbours have a special appeal that many find irresistible. While each town or village has its own distinct character, together they epitomize a separate spectrum of Swahili culture. For although the whole coast is – broadly – "Swahili", there's a world of difference between these islands and the coconut beaches of Mombasa and Malindi. To a great extent the islands are anachronisms. Electricity arrived here only a few decades ago, there are still almost no motor vehicles, and life moves at the pace of a donkey or a dhow. Yet there have been considerable internal changes over the centuries and Lamu itself is now changing faster than ever. Because of its special position in the Islamic world as a much-respected religious teaching centre, Saudi Arabian aid has poured into the island: the hospital, schools and religious centres are all supported by it. At the same time, there have been efforts to open up Lamu beyond its present tourist market, which so far has encompassed only budget travellers and short-stay air safaris. Foreign sponsors are eagerly sought and several lodging houses have been set up with what is bluntly called "white-girl money". Islanders are ambivalent about the future. A string of hotels along the beach, a bridge to the mainland – all seems possible, and all would contribute to the destruction of Lamu's timeless character. Some upcountry officials working here might not disapprove – with only a couple of bars, the town is not a popular posting. But the damage that would be done goes further than spoiling the tranquillity. The Lamu archipelago is one of the most important sources for knowledge about pre-colonial Africa. Archeological sites indicate that towns have existed on these islands for at least 1200 years. The dunes behind Lamu beach, for example, are said to conceal the remains of long-deserted settlements. And somewhere close by on the mainland, perhaps just over the border in Somalia, archeologists expect one day to uncover the ruins of Shungwaya, the town which the nine tribes that comprise the Mijikenda people claim as their ancestral home. The whole region is an academic's delight, a source of endless confusion and controversy, and a place where there is still real continuity between history and modern life. Lamu island itself, most people's single destination, still has plenty to recommend it, despite a serious fire in 1993 and the inevitable sprouting of satellite dishes. Manda, directly opposite, is little visited except for the lifeline it provides with the outside world – the local airstrip. Pate island, accessible by dhow or motorboat, makes a fascinating excursion if you have a week or more in the area. Kiwaiyu, not quite within the archipelago, but exotic and alluring enough to be worth the effort, is a wisp of a beach island 9km long and less than 1km across, lying to the northeast of the other islands. Those who visit Kiwaiyu normally arrive by air, but you can also reach it by grouping together to charter a dhow in Lamu.

Originally posted by *Ibtisam: WHY should Arab countries help us? What is in it for them. ****** nacnac- no one owes us anything. Ma lacag baan uu diibaney. :rolleyes: Its in their Charter to do so, and benefits attached geographical countries stability.

Al-Shabaab Seize Islands Near Kenya http://www.newstimeafrica.com/archives/9741 Al-Shabaab Militant Terror Group The Al-qaeda inspired Al-shabasb militants in Somalia have seized five islands near the Kenyan coast, the group’s spokesman in the southern Jubba regions told reporters on Wednesday. Spokesman Sheik Hassan Yaqub Ali said that the Mujahideens have peacefully taken the five islands including Raskamboni and Kudha both two important hideouts early on Wednesday morning. “We arrived here to implement the Islamic law, and this is kind of extending our rule into more lands in Somalia” the militant spokesman added during a press conference in the Raskamboni Island on Wednesday. “The Mujahideens have realized their grip on all southern regions in Somalia and in the near future we hope to govern all Somalia under the holy Quran rule” he stated. This foolish doctrine based on Islamic Sharia law has not been embraced by Muslims in the wider Islamic world as most of them see this fundamentalist Islamic translation of Sharia law as the Muslim extremists’ way of strangling the peaceful teachings of the Quran. Sharia law does not seem to have any place in contemporary Islamic lifestyle because of the terror, brutality and consistent human rights abuses associated with it. The Islands were formerly controlled by another Islamist rebel group Hezbal Islam which was driven out of the southern Jubba regions after clashes with Al-shabab which the United States accuses of being Alqaed’s proxy in the horn of Africa. Last week the Kenyan government closed its border with Somalia after it deployed hundreds of its military troops along the 600KM border-line as militants were advancing to the Kenyan side of the border

A New Paradigm for Engaging Somalia Somalia The stakes are much higher than ever before. And, despite the negative reports that dominate the news and thus perpetuate the sense of hopelessness, voices of reason are becoming more audible against the current senseless violence, chaos and extremism. More and more Somalis are coming to realize that the path ahead leads nowhere except the assured suicide of a nation. In various circles—especially within the Somali Diaspora—there are lively discussions on the seemingly forgotten values of compromise, coexistence, collective security and common-good. And the consensus seems to gravitate toward two particular priorities. First, in supporting the unity government despite its relative challenges, deficiencies and dysfunctions, so long as it puts reconciliation on top of its agenda and works toward the eradication of the clan-based appointment system known as “4.5” (four point half). Second, advocating for the international community’s direct involvement in solving the Somali political problem. Yes, that same political entity that has no transparent vision, mission or any form of accountability as it has no physical office or address, no overtly known leader or board of trustees, no telephone number or e-mail address. And yes, that same political powerhouse that prematurely used the military option against the Islamic Courts Union and supported Ethiopia in its brutal occupation of Somalia, and abandoned Somalia for two decades to descend into the lowest of the low. After all it is the only thing that makes pragmatic sense. On their part, as was reiterated in the 16th meeting of the ICG (International Contact Group) recently held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, the international community is committed to take a more active role in the Somali issue. The December 3rd atrocious bombing that killed 22 people including cabinet ministers, graduated medical students, faculty and parents during a graduation ceremony is now recognized as the tipping point of two decades of violence in Somalia. Since that horrific event, there has been anxious maneuvering on the part of the international community to accelerate its involvement and take direct sustainable actions that help stabilize the situation. Though the international community’s interest in Somalia is broad, here is some of the oft-cited strategic rationale: - To prevent potential spread of transnational terrorism - To prevent radicalization of Somali Diaspora youth - To find a home for the floating command center known as AFRICOM (Africa Command Center) - To control the Indian Ocean and thus control the life-line of China’s energy security as its oil imports from various African nations travel through that route - To protect one of the world’s most critical commercial arteries from piracy - To monitor and stabilize the threat coming from a volatile geographical area that the Pentagon refers as The Arc of Instability [somalia, Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Kenya. 2/3 of the world’s refugee population come from three of these countries] - To provide access to the identified but unexplored natural resources The UN economic sanctions imposed on Eritrea for its role in funding the militant Al-Shabab and Hizbul Islam against the unity government is seen as the first step toward the reinvigorated commitment. Meanwhile, within the international community, more specifically the US policy which functions as its moral compass, the remnant of the previous administration is relentlessly pushing the military option—including the use of private security contractors—as they claim that al-Qaida has already set up an active terrorist franchise in Somalia, though there is hardly convincing evidence to confirm that. As was learned from the Iraq war, if you draw the devil in the walls long enough, the devil will eventually appear in person. Claim that Al-Qaida has found a base in Somalia long enough and that will surely become the case in due course; and that could ignite new problems and disasters in Somalia. If there is any wisdom to be gained out of this young 21st century it has to do with the costly lesson that “hard power” (mainly military, technological, and economic) alone cannot sustain peace or political influence. Any effort intended for effective political problem-solving and conflict-resolution must be made of a mix that includes “soft power” (public diplomacy, humanitarian and development aid, strategic educational campaigns, political and/or economic pressure). China uses this latter approach to expand its political influence around the world. If military power alone could stabilize Somalia or in any way solve its political problem, it would’ve happened when thousands of US Marines were stationed in Somalia between 1992 and 1994; or when the late General Mohamed Farrah Aidid assembled the largest ever clan-coalition between 1995 and 19996; or when Ethiopia unleashed its brutal 2 year occupation between 2007 and 2009. So, any effective engagement on the part of the international community would require an approach that is radically different from the one applied in the last two decades; and this, needless to say, would require new thinking. The all too familiar kneejerk reactions when it comes to dealing with “Islamists” have proven counterproductive. Relying solely on violence would only make matters worse, especially for the estimated 3.5 million people on the verge of starvation. And, since all other things have failed, it behoves the international community to try soft power while expanding the African Union mandated AMISOM into a UN operation. Adding forces from Muslim countries such as Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and Pakistan and keeping the frontline states such as Ethiopia and Kenya out. Soft power is by no means cheap; however, it is much cheaper than wars and their destruction of lives and properties. Therefore, the international community should flood Somalia with food and medicine- an amount that far exceeds what would eventually be stolen and end up in the wrong hands. The supply should be so abundant that the biggest problem becomes keeping pace with storage and distribution of these essential human needs. Despite the seeming humanitarian extravagance, this approach which I referred to as Operation 3.5 in another article is likely to be much cheaper than the military option. Second, to invest in a national disarmament project in which people are offered to sell their weapons for highly competitive prices and all disarmed individuals are offered training programs such as micro-enterprise (small businesses to sustain themselves) and perhaps offered small grants after completing such programs. Third, start a strategic reconstruction project- a massive construction project to build a safe haven for essential institutions and to provide jobs to many who currently have to do the unthinkable to feed themselves and their families. Fourth, to empower civil societies already engaged in promoting inter-Somali dialogue and are sporadically building bridges of understanding, collaboration and forgiveness. With the right training and funding, some of these organizations could play pivotal role in paving the way for a viable organic reconciliation process woven with the necessary religious and cultural values. Fifth, offer confidence-building amnesty to key individual players who are on the US terrorist list as these lists further radicalize people. There is an across generational rising political consciousness, or movement, if you will, that is gaining traction. Its motto is “enough is enough”. This rapidly growing segment of the population who espouse that view is ready to welcome any new idea or initiative that is different than the rackets of the past two decades. They hinge their hope on President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed whose vision, charisma and moral balance radiate promising optimism. Abukar Arman is a writer who lives in Ohio.

persanal experiances and learning from ones, and others mistakes is what changes you for the better, along with age and responsibility to ones family.

http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/AUC/Departments/PSC/AMISOM/CSS/military_component_1.jpg Here iswhat AMISOM Controls for the TFG

Somalia sacks its police and military chiefs Abdi Guled | Reuters MOGADISHU: Somalia’s government fired the head of its police force and its military chief on Sunday, two days after a suicide bomber killed three ministers and several others in the capital of the lawless Horn of Africa nation. A fourth minister died from his wounds sustained in that attack on Sunday. Ministers had been debating for several weeks about replacing the two men to bolster security before a government spokesman announced the sacking of police commander Abdi Hassan Awale and military commander Yusuf Hussein. “Ali Mohamed Hassan, a former ambassador, was appointed police commander while Mohamed Gelle Kahiye, a senior military colonel, was appointed Somali military commander,” Abdi Haji Gobdon said. Hassan was sacked in 2007 and replaced by Awale. Hussein had been at his post for close to a year. Neighboring Kenya has stepped up police patrols in Eastleigh, a Nairobi suburb, which is predominantly inhabited by ethnic Somalis, residents said. Thursday’s hotel bombing in Mogadishu heightened concerns about Somalia’s ability to destabilize the region. “Police have arrested more than 80 people in the last two days, Somalis and non-Somalis. They are arresting everyone who does not have immigration papers,” Hussein Mohamed, deputy head of Eastleigh Business Association, said. “There are fears that fighters from Somalia may infiltrate the area and attack Nairobi.” Somalia’s UN-backed government of President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed is battling an insurgency by two rebel groups seeking to enforce their rule. At least 10 people died and a dozen others were injured in the early hours of Sunday after the country’s main rebel group, Al-Shabab, attacked Basra, a town to the north of the capital. Residents said Al-Shabab attacked early in the morning with dozens of heavily armed vehicles and engaged scores of armed Ahlu Sunna men in a fight with machine guns and rocket propelled-grenades. Ahlu Sunna is linked to President Ahmed’s administration.

Question for the experts here at SOL: Which organization has more money, or is better funded? IGAD or AU ?